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1. I n t r o d u c t i o n  and Summarv 
T h i s  paper  p rov ides  a t h e o r y  of i n d i v i d u a l  b idding  be- 
h a v i o r  i n  c o m p e t i t i v e  s e a l e d  t e n d e r  marke t s .  T h e  o b j e c t i v e  
i s  t o  fo rmula t e  a b idd ing  model i n  t e r m s  of modern u t i l i t y  
t h e o r y  and t o  d e r i v e  i t s  bas ic  p r o p e r t i e s .  The model p re -  
s e n t e d  i n  t h i s  paper  d i f f e r s  i n  impor t an t  ways from t h e  
expec ted  u t i l i t y  maximization b idding  models i ndependen t ly  
fo rmula t ed  by G r e i s m e r ,  Lev i t an ,  and Shubik [4], and by 
Vernon Smith [ 7 1 .  For one t h i n g ,  bo th  G r e i s m e r ,  e t  a l ,  
and Smith assume t h a t  t h e  b i d d e r  maximizes expec ted  u t i l i t y  
of income. We assume t h a t  t h e  b i d d e r  maximizes expec ted  
u t i l i t y  of w e a l t h ,  t h e  improvement be ing  t h a t  u t i l i t y  i s  
made t o  depend on both  the  s i z e  of t h e  payoff  and t h e  l e v e l  
o f  i n i t i a l  wea l th .  
(1) Research p a r t i a l l y  sponsored by t h e  A i r  Force  O f f i c e  of 
S t a t e s  A i r  Fo rce ,  under AFOSR Grant  No. AF-AFOSR-746-65 and 
p a r t i a l l y  sponsored by t h e  N a t i o n a l  Space Admin i s t r a t ion  under 
C o n t r a c t  NGR-26-004-012 .  
. S c i e n t i f i c  Resea rch ,  Of f i ce  of Aerospace Research,  U n i t e d .  
( 2 )  Research sponsored by t h e  N a t i o n a l  Space Admin i s t r a t ion  
under  C o n t r a c t  >?GR-26-004-012 .  
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A second difference relates to the form of the utility 
function. Greismer, et al, implicitly assume that utility 
is a homogeneous linear function of income. 
that linear utility functions, whether or not homogeneous, 
imply "neu-trality" to risk; i.e., the ir,dividual will be 
indifferent between engaging in any arbitrary bet and re- 
ceiving the sure option equal to the actuarial value of the 
bet. This type of implied behavior seems hardly consistent 
with intuitive evidence or observation. On the other hand, 
Smith assumes in places that utility is quadratic in income. 
This form of utility function is very prevalent in the 
literature on decision making under uncertainty and has been 
the basis for the mean-variance approach to the theory of 
portfolio selection. However, the quadratic utility function 
implies implausible behavior. A s  K. J. Arrow [2] has noted, 
it violates the principle of decreasing absolute risk aversion. 
It a l so  implies that eventually wealth has negative marginal 
utility, so that it would be better to throw some away. Be- 
cause of the implausible behavioral implications of linear 
and quadratic utility functions, we assume that utility is 
a concave function of wealth, this being the most general 
form of utility function which characterizes risk averse 
behavior. 
It is well known 
Finally, the emphasis in this paper on deriving the 
formal properties of the model and giving their economic 
, 
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i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  i s  a l s o  q u i t e  un ique  and t u r n s  o u t  t o  be 
rewarding .  A n a t u r a l  r e l a t i o n s h i p  emerges between t h e  p r i n -  
c i p a l  p r o p e r t i e s  of t h e  model and c e r t a i n  t o o l s  and c o n c e p t s  
which have been developed i n  some b ranches  o f  ma themat i ca l  
s t a t i s t i c s  on t h e  one hand, and i n  t h e  t h e o r y  of risk a v e r s i o n  
o n  t h e  o t h e r .  S p e c i f i c a l l y ,  a n  i n v e s t i g a t i a n  of  t h e  s o l u t i o n  
p r o p e r t i e s  of t h e  model r e v e a l s  t h e  i m p o r t a n t  r o l e  of t h e  
"haza rd  ra te"  o r  " f a i l u r e  ra te"  f u n c t i o n ,  a b a s i c  concep t  i n  
t h e  ma themat i ca l  t h e o r y  of r e l i a b i l i t y  131. A t  t h e  same t i m e ,  
w e  f i n d  t h a t  some o f  t h e  more i m p o r t a n t  compara t ive  s t a t i c s  
p r o p e r t i e s  of t h e  model depend on t h e  behav io r  o f  t w o  f u n c t i o n s ,  
o n e  of which h a s  been independen t ly  e s t a b l i s h e d  as  a measure 
of r i s k  a v e r s i o n  by K .  J .  A r r o w  111, 121, and by J .  W .  P r a t t  
[6]. A s  f a r  as w e  know, t h e  o t h e r  f u n c t i o n  has  n o t  bccn 
i n t e r p r e t e d  as a measure of r i s k  a v e r s i o n  i n  t h e  l i t e r a t u r e  
p r ior  t o  t h i s .  W e  e s t a b l i s h  it a s  such  and r e l a t e  it t o  t h e  
work of Arrow and t o  tha t  o f  P r a t t .  
I n  S e c t i o n  2 w e  f o r m u l a t e  t h e  b i d d i n g  model and g i v e  con- 
d i t i o n s  under  which t h e  model has  a un ique  s o l u t i o n .  The 
h a z a r d  r a t e  f u n c t i o n  i s  i n t e r p r e t e d  and t h e  e x p r e s s i o n  d e t e r -  
min ing  t h e  o p t i m a l  b i d  i s  shown t o  have a s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d  
b e h a v i o r a l  meaning. S e c t i o n  3 c o n t a i n s  a summary o f  t h e  work 
o f  A r r o w  and P r a t t  and some new r e s u l t s  i n  t h e  t h e o r y  of  r i s k  
a v e r s i o n .  S e c t i o n  4 c o n t a i n s  an i n v e s t i g a t i o n  of t h e  compara- 
t i v e  s t a t i c s  p r o p e r t i e s  of t h e  model and t h e i r  r e l a t i o n  t o  t h e  
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e x i s t e n c e  of r i s k  a v e r s i o n  and t h e  behav io r  of two measures 
of r i s k  a v e r s i o n .  I n  c o n t r a s t  t o  t h e  u s u a l  t r e a t m e n t  of 
comparat ive s t a t i c s  i n  economic t h e o r y ,  bo th  t h e  d i r e c t i o n  of 
change i n  t h e  op t ima l  b i d  p r i c e  and bounds on i t s  magnitude 
a r e  cons ide red .  The a n a l y s i s  i s  soriiewhat revea l i r ig  of t h e  
n a t u r e  of t h e  s u b s t i t u t i o n s  between " s a f e t y "  (as measured 
by t h e  p r o b a b i l i t y  of  success )  and p o t e n t i a l  p r o f i t s  t h a t  
u n d e r l i e  t h e  b i d d e r ' s  response  t o  a change i n  a s p e c i f i e d  
parameter .  I n  S e c t i o n  5 w e  b r i e f l y  o u t l i n e  p o s s i b l e  d i r e c -  
t i o n s  i n  which t h e  model can be extended.  
2 .  An Expected U t i l i t y  Maximization B idd ins  Model 
T h i s  sec t ion  d e a l s  with t h e  s t r u c t u r e  and b a s i c  prop- 
er t ies  of  an  expected u t i l i t y  maximizat ion bid.ding model f o r  
t h e  s e a l e d  t e n d e r  s e l l i n g  m a r k e t .  The i n s t i t u t i o n a l  f e a t u r e s  
of t h i s  market  a r e  o u t l i n e d  as fo l lows :  t h e  market  c o n s i s t s  
of a number of se l lers  competing f o r  a s i n g l e  c o n t r a c t ;  each  
sel ler  submi ts  a s i n g l e  s e a l e d  b i d ;  and t h e  c o n t r a c t  i s  awarded 
t o  t h e  lowest b i d d e r .  Each s e l l e r ' s  d e c i s i o n  v a r i a b l e  i s  h i s  
b i d  p r i c e .  Every se l le r  rea l izes  t h a t  t h e  h i g h e r  h i s  b i d  
p r i c e  t h e  s m a l l e r  t h e  p r o b a b i l i t y  of g e t t i n g  t h e  c o n t r a c t ,  
b u t  t h e  l a r g e r  t h e  p r o f i t s  should  he g e t  i t .  Thus, each 
submi t t ed  b i d  r e f l e c t s  a n  a t t e m p t  t o  ba l ance  p r o b a b i l i t y  and 
p r o f i t  c o n s i d e r a t i o n s .  
, 
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To introduce the model  we focus on a typical seller and 
denote his average cost by c . Because n , the size of the 
contract, is fixed in the type of market under consideration, 
c = c ( n )  is a constant for any given bidding decision. Re- 
garding the seller's beliefs abogt the bidding behavior of 
his opponents, we assume that the seller attaches a proba- 
bility distribution F ( b )  to the minimum of his competitor's 
bid prices b . We let p denote the bid submitted by the 
seller. He will get the contract if he submits a bid that 
is below all of the bids submitted by his competitors, that 
is, if p < b . The probability that his bid will be success- 
f u l  is 
( 2 . 1 )  P ~ { P  < bI = 1 - F ( p )  
We assume that F is continuous, so that the probability of 
a "tie" between bids is zero; because F is continuous, what 
happens in case of a tie does not affect the seller's proba- 
bility of getting the contract. 
The bidding situation f a c i n g  the seller is equivalent 
to choosing p in a lottery which offers a prize of n(p - c) 
with probability 1 - F(p) and a prize of zero with proba- 
bility F(p) . Note that the prize zero corresponds to an 
unsuccessful bid. The utility of a prize depends on its 
size and on the seller's initial wealth w . In particular, 
the utility of the prize zero is u(w) . The seller, being 
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a von Neumann-Morgenstern expec ted  u t i l i t y  maximizer ,  
chooses  p so as  t o  maximize his expec ted  u t i l i t y  
E (p ;c ,w ,n )  , w h e r e  
( 2 - 2 )  E(p;c ,W,n)  - = [1 - F ( p ) I u [ n ( p  - C )  I- W l  + F ( p ) u ( W ) .  
A r ea r r angemen t  of terms reduces  t h i s  t o  t h e  more conven ien t  
form 
( 2 . 3 )  E(p ;c ,w ,n )  [1 - F ( p ) I  [ u ( n ( p  - c)  + w} - u(w) 1 + u ( w ) .  
Any p which maximizes E(p ;c ,w ,n )  5 E ( p )  f o r  f i x e d  v a l u e s  
of t h e  pa rame te r s  c ,  w ,  and n w i l l  be c a l l e d  a s o l u t i o n  
of t h e  model o r  a n  op t ima l  b i d .  
Our immediate concern i s  whether  t h e  model h a s  a s o l u -  
t i o n ,  and if so ,  whether  t h e  s o l u t i o n  i s  unique .  
theorems p r e s e n t e d  below g i v e  c o n d i t i o n s  under  which t h e r e  
e x i s t s  a n  o p t i m a l  b i d  and c o n d i t i o n s  under  which t h a t  o p t i m a l  
b i d  i s  unique .  
number 
( 2 . 4 )  X = min{p:F(p) = 1) . 
From t h e  d e f i n i t i o n  of X it  follows t h a t  i f  t h e  se l le r  
submi t s  a b i d  g rea te r  than  or  e q u a l  t o  
opponents  w i l l  g e t  t h e  c o n t r a c t ,  so  E(p )  = u(w) f o r  a l l  
p A .  I f ,  on t h e  o t h e r  hand, t h e  s e l l e r ' s  b i d  p i s  less 
t h a n  o r  e q u a l  t o  h i s  u n i t  cost  
g a i n  even i f  h e  wins t h e  c o n t r a c t  s i n c e  E ( p )  < u(w) f o r  
a l l  p < c. Thus,  f o r  a b i d  p t o  be  " r e a s o n a b l e , "  i t  
must  s a t i s f y  c < p and p < A .  I n  o r d e r  t h a t  a " reason-  
able" b i d  be a v a i l a b l e  t o  t h e  s e l l e r  w e  r e q u i r e  t h a t  
The t w o  
To s t a t e  t h e  theorems w e  need t o  d e f i n e  t h e  
X t h e n  one  o f  h i s  
c ,  t h e n  he  h a s  n o t h i n g  t o  
- 
- 
c < A. 
, 
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W e  n o t e  f r o m  ( 2 . 3 )  t h a t  e v e r y  b i d  i n  t h e  i n t e r v a l  ( c ,  A) 
gives a h i g h e r  expec ted  u t i l i t y  E ( p )  t h a n  u(w) . W e  are  
now i n  a p o s i t i o n  t o  s t a t e  o u r  two theorems on t h e  e x i s t -  
ence  and un iqueness  of a n  o p t i m a l  b i d .  ' 
Theorem 1 : ( E x i s t e n c e  T h e o r e m )  I f  3 
I ( A I )  C < X < 
( A 2 1  u i s  con t inuous  and s t r i c t l y  i n c r e a s i n g ,  and 
( A 3 )  F i s  con t inuous  ( w i t h  o r  w i t h o u t  a d e n s i t y ) ,  
t h e n  t h e r e  e x i s t s  an  op t ima l  b i d  ( n o t  n e c e s s a r i l y  unique)  
i n  t h e  i n t e r v a l  ( c ,  A ) .  
Proof: Under assumpt ions  ( A l )  , ( A 2 ) ,  and ( A 3 )  w e  see t h a t  
E ( p )  = [ l - F ( p )  1 [u{n(p-c)+wI-u(w) 1 + u(w) i s  a con t inuous  
f u n c t i o n  of p on  t h e  compact se t  [ c ,  X I ,  t h a t  
E ( p )  > u(w) for a l l  p i n  ( c ,  A ) ,  and t h a t  
E ( c )  = E ( p )  = u(w) . Thus t h e r e  e x i s t s  a number 
n e c e s s a r i l y  unique)  i n  [ c ,  X I  such t h a t  
E ( p  ) = max(E(p) I C  p - < X I ,  and s i n c e  
E ( p )  > u(w) = E ( c )  = E ( A )  f o r  a l l  p i n  (c,  A ) ,  it 
fo l lows  t h a t  po # c and po # A .  
( n o t  PO 
0 
( 3 )  The assumpt ion  X < 00 i s  n o t  nec.essary i n  t h i s  work. 
I n  t h i s  proof  w e  use [ l - F ( p ) ] u { n ( p - c ) + w )  + 0 as p + X .  
T h i s  i s  t r u e  i f  u i s  bounded, o r  i f  X < m, or i f  
I p d F ( p )  i s  f i n i t e  and u i s  concave.  W e  u s e  X < n o t  
o n l y  because  t h e  assumption s i m p l i f i e s  t h e  proof of  t h i s  
theorem,  b u t  a l s o  because  it i s  d i f f i c u l t  ( i f  n o t  imposs- 
i b l e )  t o  conce ive  of  a s i t u a t i o n  i n  which X = a. 
, 
I -  
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Having g i v e n  c o n d i t i o n s  u n G x  which t h e r e  e x i s t s  an 
optimal b i d ,  w e  now show t h a t  under  s u i t a b l e  assumpt ions  
t h i s  o p t i m a l  b i d  i s  unique.  
theorem assumpt ions  ( A 2 a )  and (A3a) imply ( A 2 )  and (A3) of 
Theorem 1 r e s p e c t i v e l y .  
Note t h a t  i n  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  
Theorem 2 :  (Uniqueness t h e o r e m )  Suppose: 
(Al) c < A < ; 
( A 2 a )  u i s  con t inuous ,  s t r i c t l y  i n c r e a s i n g ,  and 
concave ; 
(A3a) F i s  a b s o l u t e l y  con t inuous  w i t h  d e n s i t y  f ,  
and t h e  hazard  r a t e  f u n c t i o n  
i s  a nondecreas ing  f u n c t i o n  o f  
f ( p ) / [ l - F ( p ) ]  
p .  
Then t h e r e  is a unique  op t ima l  b i d  
(c, A ) ,  and fo r  p i n  ( c ,  A ) ,  t h e  e x p r e s s i o n  
po i n  t h e  i n t e r v a l  
i s  p o s i t i v e  f o r  p < p, and n e g a t i v e  f o r  p > p,. I n  
( 2 . 5 ) ,  t h e  m a r g i n a l  u t i l i t y  f u n c t i o n  u '  can be t a k e n  t o  
be t h e  r i g h t  d e r i v a t i v e  of u ,  t h a t  i s  
u ( t  + h)  - u ( t )  
h 
I f  f (p )  and u t  [ n ( p  - c )  + w l  are  con t inuous  f o r  p i n  
(c ,  A ) ,  t h e n  Po 
( 2 . 5 ) .  
u ' ( t )  = l i m  
hJ-0 
i s  t h e  unique  z e r o  i n  ( c ,  A )  of  e x p r e s s i o n  
, 
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P roof :  
Because of t h e  assumptions made a b o u t  u and f , 
E ( p )  = - F ( p ) l  [u{n(p  - c) + w} - u ( w ) l  f u(w) 
h a s  a r i g h t  d e r i v a t i v e  D t ( E ( p ) )  a lmos t  everywhere and 
i s  t h e  i n t e g r a l  of t h i s  r i g h t  d e r i v a t i v e .  ( W e  can con- 
s i d e r  f t o  be t h e  r i g h t  d e r i v a t i v e  of F . )  W e  have 
D+ (E ( p )  1 = -f ( p )  [u{n (p-c) tw} - u (w)  3 + [ 1-F (p )  1 nu '  [n  (p-c) +wl 
E (a )  (b) 
where 
a [ l - F ( p )  1 [u{n (p-c) -t w} - u ( w )  1 
and 
and u ' ( t )  = D S ( u ( t ) )  i s  t h e  m a r g i n a l  u t i l i t y .  From t h e  
d e f i n i t i o n  of A w e  see t h a t  [ l - F ( p ) ]  > 0 f o r  a l l  
p < h , and s i n c e  u i s  s t r i c t l y  i n c r e a s i n g ,  
u (n (p -c )  + w} - u(w) > 0 f o r  p > c . Thus t h e  e x p r e s s i o n  
(a )  i s  p o s i t i v e  f o r  c < p < h . 
i n  t h e  PO W e  w i l l  show t h a t  t h e r e  e x i s t s  a un ique  
i n t e r v a l  ( c ,  A )  such  t h a t  t h e  e x p r e s s i o n  (b)  i s  p o s i t i v e  
f o r  p < p and n e g a t i v e  f o r  p > po . Then, f o r  p i n  
( c ,  1) , t h i s  would make D + ( E ( p ) )  p o s i t i v e  f o r  p < po 
and n e g a t i v e  f o r  p > po so t h a t  E ( p )  i s  s t r i c t l y  
i n c r e a s i n g  f o r  p < po and s t r i c t l y  d e c r e a s i n g  f o r  p > po , 
and t h u s  E ( p )  has  a unique  maximum a t  p = po. 
0 
- 1 0  - 
W e  n o t e  t h a t :  
( 3 )  
so t h a t  
( 4 )  
U '  [n(p-c)  + w] i s  p o s i t i v e  and non- inc reas ing  
i n  p s i n c e  u i s  concave and s t r i c t l y  i n c r e a s i n g :  
l i m  u [ n ( p - c )  t wl - u(w) = 0 ;  
P-fC 
u [ n ( p - c )  + w] - u(w) i s  s t r i c t l y  i n c r e a s i n g  i n  p ; 
i s  s t r i c t l y  d e c r e a s i n g  u '  [n (p -c )  + w] u [ n ( p - c )  + wl - u(w) 
i n  p f o r  c < p ; 
and 
- - a .  u' [n(p-c)  - + w] ( 5 )  l i m  
p+c 
u [ n ( p - c >  + wl - u(w) 
By assumption , i s  non-decreas ing ,  so  e x p r e s s i o n  ( b )  
1-F ( p )  
i s  s t r i c t l y  d e c r e a s i n g  i n  p . I f  l i m ( b )  > 0 and 
P+C 
f (PI 
1-F ( p )  
l i m ( b )  < 0 , t h e n  t h e  d e s i r e d  p, e x i s t s .  But l i m  
P+X P+C 
is non-negat ive  and f i n i t e ,  so  it follows from (5 )  t h a t  
S i n c e  h < m, 
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f(t) - non-decreasing we must have lim l-F(t) - 00. 
t+A 
Thus we see 
that lim(b) = -00 < 0. Hence conditions for the desired 
P+A 
to exist are satisfied. PO 
If u'(n(p-c) + w) and f(p) are continuous for p 
in (c, A ) ,  then expression (b) is continuous for p in 
(c, A )  and must assume the value zero somewhere in the 
interval by the mean value theorem. Since (b) is either 
positive or negative for each p # po in (c, A), it 
follows that p, is the unique zero of expression (b) 
in (c, A ) .  0 
In the remainder of this section we denonstra-te that 
the expression (2.5) determining the optimal bid has a 
meaningful economic interpretation. To show this we define 
nu'[n(p-c) + w] 
u[n(p-c) + wl - u(w) and G(p) E . G(p) can f (PI H ( p )  E l-F(p) 
be thought of as the rate of proportionate change in utility 
of profits as a function of the bid price p .  Note that be- 
cause of the assumptions about u, G(p) is a strictly de- 
creasing function of p. The function H plays an important 
role in many disciplines, particularly actuarial science and 
the mathematical theory of reliability, and is usually called 
the "hazard rate'' or the "failure rate." In the context 
I .  
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of our model, H (p) dp approximately represents the proba- 
bility that a bid of size p + dp would be unsuccessful 
given that a bid of size p would have been successful. 
Thus H(p) is the rate of proportionate increase in the 
probabi1.j.t-y of losing the contract as a function of p . 
It seems natural to assume that H(p) is a non-decreasing 
function of p . This is equivalent to assuming that the 
conditional probability that the minimum of the opponents' 
bids is at least p + dp given that it is at least p 
is a non-increasing function of p . (Intuitively, one 
-_ 
might think of this, when applied to an individual, as 
saying that if a person is contemplating making a bid of 
p , then he is more likely to raise it an amount dp if 
p is a low bid than if p is a high bid.) 
The above definitions enable us to rewrite expressioll 
(2.5) as G(p) - H(p) . From Theorem 2 we know there exists 
in the interval (c, A) such that a unique optimal bid 
G(p) 3 H(p) when p > p, . Thus for bids less (greater) 
than po the rate of proportionate increase in the utility 
of profits exceeds (falls short of) the rate of proportionate 
increase in the probability of losing the contract, and 
expected utility can be increased by raising (lowering) the 
PO 
< 
bid. Theorem 2 further states that if the marginal utility 
U' [n(p-c> + wl and the probability density f (p) are 
I .  
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c o n t i n u o u s  f u n c t i o n s  of p i n  t h e  i n t e r v a l  ( c ,  A) , t h e n  
t h e  o p t i m a l  b id  
G(p)  = H(p) . Tha t  i s ,  G(po) = H(po) and G(p)  i H(p) 
when p > po . Thus when m a r g i n a l  u t i l i t y  and t h e  proba- 
b i l i t y  d e n s i t y  a re  con t inuous  f u n c t i o n s  of p , expec ted  
u t i l i t y  i s  maximized and t h e  o p t i m a l  b i d  i s  d e t e r n i n e t i  by 
e q u a t i n g  t h e  r a t e  of p r o p o r t i o n a t e  i n c r e a s e  i n  t h e  u t i l i t y  
of p r o f i t s  t o  t h e  r a t e  of p r o p o r t i o n a t e  increase i n  t h e  
p r o b a b i l i t y  of l o s i n g  t h e  c o n t r a c t .  T h i s  i s  an i n t u i t i v e l y  
meaningfu l  r e s u l t  and i s  n o t  immediately obvious  from an  
examinat ion  of t h e  s t r u c t u r e  of  t h e  model. F i g u r e  1 p r e s e n t s  
a g r a p h i c  i l l u s t r a t i o n  of t h e  s o l u t i o n  of t h e  e q u a t i o n  
G ( p )  = H(p) . F i g u r e  2 i n d i c a t e s  what can  happen when t h e  
h a z a r d  r a t e  f u n c t i o n  is  d i s c o n t i n u o u s .  The same s o r t  of 
t h i n g  can  happen when G ( p )  i n s t e a d  of H(p) i s  d i s c o n t i n u o u s .  
F o r  t h e s e  cases po is  t h e  un ique  v a l u e  of p f o r  which 
t h e  e x p r e s s i o n  G(p)  - H ( p )  changes s i g n .  
i s  t h e  un ique  s o l u t i o n  o f  t h e  e q u a t i o n  PO 
< 
- 14 - 
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3 .  Risk  Avers ion  and i t s  Measurement 
L e t  u be a u t i l i t y  f u n c t i o n  f o r  w e a l t h  w i t h  m a r g i n a l  
u t i l i t y  s t r i c t l y  p o s i t i v e .  The purpose  of  t h i s  s e c t i o n  i s  
t o  demons t r a t e  t h a t  t h e  f u n c t i o n s  A ( t )  = -u"  (t) / u t  ( t)  and 
P ( t ;  w) = - t u "  (t+w) / u '  ( t + w )  f o r  each  f i x e d  w can be 
i n t e r p r e t e d  a s  t w o  measures  of  r i s k  a v e r s i o n .  W e  se t  f o r t h  
t h e  economic meanings o f  A and P h e r e  because ,  as  w i l l  
be shown l a t e r ,  some impor t an t  compara t ive  s t a t i c s  p r o p e r t i e s  
o f  t h e  b i d d i n g  model can  be de t e rmined  from t h e  b e h a v i o r  
o f  t h e s e  t w o  f u n c t i o n s .  
W e  b e g i n  by d e f i n i n g  r i s k  a v e r s i o n .  An i n d i v i d u a l  i s  
a r i s k  averter if f o r  any a r b i t r a r y  r i s k  h e  p r e f e r s  t h e  
non-random amount e q u a l  t o  t h e  a c t u a r i a l  v a l u e  of t h e  r i s k  
t o  t h e  r i s k  i t s e l f .  L e t  w be h i s  i n i t i a l  w e a l t h  and z , 
a random v a r i a b l e ,  b e  h i s  income. H e  i s  r i s k  a v e r s e  i f  
(3 .1)  u[w + E ( z ) ]  > E[u(w+z)]  
where E i s  t h e  e x p e c t a t i o n  o p e r a t o r .  A n e c e s s a r y  and 
s u f f i c i e n t  c o n d i t i o n  f o r  (3 .1)  t o  ho ld  f o r  a l l  v a l u e s  of 
w and a l l  r i s k s  z is  t h a t  t h e  u t i l i t y  of w e a l t h  f u n c t i o n  
u be s t r i c t l y  concave ,  o r  e q u i v a l e n t l y  t h a t  it be  t h e  
i n t e g r a l  of  a s t r i c t l y  d e c r e a s i n g  m a r g i n a l  u t i l i t y  of w e a l t h  
f u n c t i o n  u '  . ( u '  m a y  be  assumed t o  be e i t h e r  t h e  r i g h t  
or t h e  l e f t  d e r i v a t i v e  of u i f  such  i s  c o n v e n i e n t . )  T h i s  
g u a r a n t e e s  
I -  
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for all t > 0 - (3.2) u"(t) < 0 
and a little more. 
- 
While (3.2) indicates the existence of (a weak form of) 
risk aversion, the magnitude of u"(t) has in itself no 
meaning. The reason is that if u is a von Neumann- 
Morgenstern utility function, then the preference ordering 
represented by E(u) does not change when the utility func- 
tion u is replaced by the utility function cu -I- b if c 
is positive. However, such transformations change the magni- 
tude of u"(t) , although they do not alter its sign. Thus 
the sign but not the magnitude of u"(t) is significant. 
The foregoing suggests that a measure of risk aversion 
should in some sense measure the concavity of 
remain invariant under positive linear transformations of 
the utility function. The functions A(t) = -u"(t)/u' (t) 
and P(t; w) = -tu"(t+w)/u' (t+w) fulfill both requirements 
and hence qualify as measures of risk aversion. We will show 
that these measures have straightforward behavioral interpre- 
tations. 
u and should 
A as a Measure of Risk Aversion 
A is called absolute risk aversion. Its role as a 
measure of risk aversion w a s  discovered independently by 
Kenneth J. Arrow [l], [ 21 ,  and by John W. Pratt [ 6 ] .  Pratt 
interprets A in terms of the risk premium T defined by 
- 17 - 
t h e  e q u a t i o n  
U[W + E ( z )  - R ]  = E [ u ( w + z ) ]  . 
IT c an  be r e g a r d e d  a s  t h e  maximum amount, beyond t h e  n e g a t i v e  
of t h e  expec ted  v a l u e  of t h e  r i s k  i t s e l f ,  which a n  i n d i v i d u a l  
w i t h  w e a l t h  e q u a l  t o  w would pay t o  i n s u r e  a g a i n s t  t h e  r i s k  
z . P r a t t  [ 5 ,  page 1251  i n d i c a t e s  t h a t  under  s u i t a b l e  regu-  
l a r i t y  c o n d i t i o n s  
( 3 . 3 )  IT = ( 0 2 / 2 ) A ( w  + E ( z ) )  4- o ( 0 2 )  
where o2 i s  t h e  v a r i a n c e  o f  z .  ( W e  u s e  o ( t )  t o  d e n o t e  
any  f u n c t i o n  which i s  of smaller o r d e r  of magni tude  t h a n  t 
n e a r  0 .  I n  p a r t i c u l a r ,  o(02)/02+0 as  o2+0.) Thus,  when 
a 2  i s  s m a l l ,  n ( 0 2 / 2 ) A ( w  + E ( z ) ) .  I t  f o l l o w s  t h a t  A ( w )  
i s  abou t  twice t h e  r i s k  premium p e r  u n i t  of v a r i a n c e  f o r  
" s m a 1 1 "  a c t u a r i a l l y  n e u t r a l  ( E ( z )  = 0 )  r i s k s .  N o t e  t h a t  
i n  view o f  ( 3 . 2 )  , t h e  r i s k  premium i s  non-negat ive .  
S t i l l  a n o t h e r  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  of A h a s  been p rov ided  by 
Arrow [ 2 ,  pages 33 and 3 4 . 1  H e  c o n s i d e r s  a r i s k  which i n v o l v e s  
winning or  l o s i n g  an  amount h w i t h  p r o b a b i l i t i e s  p and 
1 - PI r e s p e c t i v e l y .  Given t h e  amount of t h e  b e t  h and 
t h e  i n i t i a l  w e a l t h  w, c o n s i d e r  t h e  p r o b a b i l i t y  p '  such  
t h a t  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l  is  j u s t  i n d i f f e r e n t  between a c c e p t i n g  
and r e j e c t i n g  t h e  b e t .  The v a l u e  of p '  i s  de termined  from 
t h e  e q u a t i o n  
U ( W )  = p'u(w+h) + ( l - p ' ) u ( w - h )  
u s i n g  f i n i t e  T a y l o r ' s  s e r i e s  expans ions  of u (wth )  and 
u(w-h) a b o u t  w.  Under  s u i t a b l e  r e g u l a r i t y  c o n d i t i o n s  on u 
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1 h  
2 p '  = - + z A ( W )  + o ( h ) .  
Thus f o r  s u f f i c i e n t l y  smal l  v a l u e s  of h ,  
( 3 . 4 )  p '  7 1 h  + ~ A ( w ) .  
I n  view of (3 .21 ,  p '  2 'z 1 . It f o l l o w s  t h a t  a b s o l u t e  r i s k  
a v e r s i o n  measures t h e  i n d i v i d u a l ' s  demand f o r  more- than- fa i r  
odds.  
A ( w )  may i n c r e a s e ,  d e c r e a s e ,  o r  remain c o n s t a n t  w i t h  
i n c r e a s i n g  wea l th .  A may b e  non-monotone f o r  some u t i l i t y  
f u n c t i o n s  and may be bounded o r  unbounded. 
( i n c r e a s i n g )  a b s o l u t e  r i s k  a v e r s i o n  means t h a t  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l  
w i l l  pay less (more) f o r  i n s u r a n c e  a g a i n s t  a g iven  r i s k  as 
Decreasing 
h i s  wea l th  i n c r e a s e s ;  a l t e r n a t i v e l y ,  t h a t  t h e  s i z e  of f a v o r -  
a b l e  odds r e q u i r e d  t o  s t a k e  a g iven  amount d imin i shes  ( i n -  
creases) w i t h  i n c r e a s i n g  w e a l t h .  
R as a Measure of  Risk Aversion 
p (t; w) = -tu1'  ( t + w )  / u t  ( t + w )  has  so f a r  a s  w e  know n o t  
appeared  i n  t h e  l i t e r a t u r e  p r i o r  t o  t h i s .  However, it appea r s  
t o  be a v a r i a n t  of t h e  measure R ( t )  = - t u "  ( t ) / u '  (t) , which 
i s  c a l l e d  r e l a t i v e  r i s k  a v e r s i o n  by Arrow and p r o p o r t i o n a l  
r i s k  avers ion  by P r a t t .  The comparat ive s t a t i c s  of t h e  
b i d d i n g  model do no t  depend on t h e  behavior  of R ,  b u t  s i n c e  
A r r o w  and P r a t t  have provided! an i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  f o r  R ,  w e  
look a t  t h i s  measure i n  o r d e r  to o b t a i n  a c l u e  a s  t o  how t o  
i n t e r p r e t  P. 
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The interpretation of R follows quite easily from 
that of A. Suppose the risk premium and the risk itself 
are measured not in absolute terms but as proportions of 
initial wealth. Let r0 = TT/W and z = z/w denote the 
proportional risk premium and the proportional risk, respec- 
tively. Then, as Pratt shows ,  if z is actuarially 
neutral (i.e., if E ( Z O )  = 0 1 ,  
0 
0 
no = (a2/2)R(w) + o( Is*) ,  
0 where cr2 is now the variance of z . A similar interpre- 
tation is provided by Arrow. Let h = h w, so that ho is 
the fraction of wealth at stake. Then, Arrow shows that 
0 
p'  = + R(w) + o(h0). 
Relative risk aversion may increase, decrease, or re- 
main constant with increasing wealth. Increasing (decreas- 
ing) relative risk aversion means that the proportion of 
wealth spent for insurance increases (decreases) when wealth 
and risk are increased in the same proportion; alternatively, 
that the size of favorable odds demanded increases (decreases) 
when wealth and bet size are increased in the same proportion. 
P as a Measure of Risk Aversion 
We are now in a position to interpret the function P 
as a measure of risk aversion. Suppose the individual's 
- 20 - 
w e a l t h  w i s  i n c r e a s e d  by a n  a r b i t r a r y  amount t .  Now 
measure t h e  r i s k  premium and t h e  r i s k  i t s e l f  a s  p r o p o r t i o n s  
of t .  L e t  IT = n / t  and z = z / t  deno te  t h e  r i s k  p re -  
mium and t h e  r i s k  r e s p e c t i v e l y ,  each measured as  a pro-  
p o r t i o n  of t h e  i n c r e a s e  i n  w e a l t h .  Under s u i t a b l e  
r e g u l a r i t y  c o n d i t i o n s  it can be shown t h a t  
- - 
( 3 . 5 )  o2  P [ t ( l + E ( z ) )  ;w] + o (02 )  - I T =  2 (1+E (E) ) 
- 
where cr2 i s  t h e  v a r i a n c e  of z . I f  E(:) = 0 then  
- 
T %  ( 0 2 / 2 ) P ( t ; w ) .  
The measure P can  a l s o  be i n t e r p r e t e d  i n  t e r m s  of 
t h e  more- than- fa i r  odds concept .  L e t  h = E t ,  so t h a t  
h i s  t h e  f r a c t i o n  of a d d i t i o n a l  wea l th  t h a t  i s  a t  s t a k e  
Then it i s  e a s y  t o  show t h a t  
- 
1 I T  p '  = - + h P ( t ; w )  + o(T;;). ( 3 . 6 )  2 
A t  a formal  level t h e  measures  R and P appear  
t o  be q u i t e  s i m i l a r .  However, t h e y  are  a s s o c i a t e d  w i t h  
two d i f f e r e n t  t y p e s  of b e t t i n g  s i t u a t i o n .  R e l a t i v e  r i s k  
a v e r s i o n  i s  r e l e v a n t  when t h e  r a t i o  o f  t h e  b e t  s i z e  t o  
w e a l t h  i s  be ing  cons idered .  The f u n c t i o n  P i s  
impor t an t  when t h e  r a t i o  of t h e  b e t  s i z e  t o  a d d i t i o n a l  
w e a l t h  i s  under c o n s i d e r a t i o n .  Note t h a t  i f  t h e  r a t i o  
of t h e  b e t  s i z e  t o  weal th  remains c o n s t a n t  t h e n  t h e  
r a t i o  of t h e  b e t  s i z e  t o  a d d i t i o n a l  wea l th  d e c r e a s e s  
- 21 - 
as  wea l th  i n c r e a s e s .  Conversely,  i f  t h e  r a t i o  of t h e  b e t  
s i z e  t o  a d d i t i o n a l  w e a l t h  i s  k e p t  c o n s t a n t  t h e n  t h e  r a t i o  
of  t h e  be t  s i z e  t o  wea l th  must increase as  wea l th  i n c r e a s e s .  
The fo l lowing  p r o p o s i t i o n s  and d i s c u s s i o n  are  i n t e n d e d  
t o  p rov ide  some i n s i g h t  i n t o  t h e  behav io r  of  P .  For t h e  
remainder  of  t h i s  s e c t i o n  w e  assume t h a t  u i s  non-decreas- 
i n g ,  t h a t  u i s  concave ( b u t  n o t  n e c e s s a r i l y  s t r i c t l y  con- 
c a v e ) ,  t h a t  u has  a cont inuous  f i r s t  d e r i v a t i v e  u t ,  
and t h a t  u t  i s  t h e  i n t e g r a l  o f  some f u n c t i o n  u" ( p o s s i b l y  
t h e  r e g u l a r  d e r i v a t i v e ,  t h e  r i g h t  d e r i v a t i v e ,  o r  t h e  l e f t  
d e r i v a t i v e  of u ' ) .  
P r o p o s i t i o n  1: F ix  w. I f  P ( t ; w )  i s  non- increas ing  i n  
t f o r  t i n  some i n t e r v a l  ( O f t o )  w i t h  to > 0 ,  t h e n  
e i t h e r  P ( t ; w )  = 0 (and consequent ly  u" ( t + w )  = 0 f o r  
0 < t < to o r  e l se  w = 0 .  
Proof: P ( t ; w )  is non-negat ive.  Assume it i s  non- 
i n c r e a s i n g  and n o t  i d e n t i c a l l y  zero f o r  
Then l i m  P ( t ; w )  > 0 .  N o w  u '  i s  non- increas ing  
0 < t < to. 
t . b  0 
and non-negat ive and c a n ' t  be i d e n t i c a l l y  ze ro  on ( 0 ,  
i f  P ( t ; w )  i s  t o  make sense. Thus w e  f i n d  a > 0 ,  
b > 0 such t h a t  f o r  0 < t < b w e  have P ( t , w )  > a 
and u ' ( t + w )  > a .  Then f o r  0 < t - < b 
- 
a a2 uI1 ( t - tw)  < - - u '  ( t - t w )  < - - t t 
. .  
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and integrating gives 
u'(w+b) - u'(w) < /t)dt = --03 
so that u'(w) = +a. Because u' is non-increasing this 
can happen only when w = 0 
functions. 
and then only for some utility 
Proposition 2: Fix w > 0 and suppose > 0. If P(t; w) 
is monotone (strictly monotone) in t for 0 < t < to, 
then it is non-decreasing (strictly increasing) there. 
Proof: Suppose P(t; w) is non-increasing for 0 < t < to. 
Then by Proposition 1 we have P(t; w) = 0 0 < t < to. 
Thus P(t; w) can't be strictly decreasing for 0 < t < to, 
and if it is non-increasing it is in fact also non-decreasing 
since it is a constant. 
for 
0 
These two propositions indicate that if w > 0 and 
we for some reason believe P(w; t) to be monotone in t, 
then we must believe either that P(w; t) is strictly in- 
creasing in t or that u(t) is linear. If we require 
strict concavity of u, then we can rule out the latter. 
Unfortunately, fluctuations are possible. It is possible to 
construct a bounded or unbounded utility function with a 
continuous second derivative for which P is not monotone 
or for which R is not monotone. It would thus seem that 
any assumptions about the monotonicity of P must be made 
on the basis of either intuitive of empirical considerations. 
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We conclude this section with the following observa- 
tion: 
Proposition 3 :  If either A(t) or R(t) is non-decreasing 
then either u"(t) f 0 ( so  that u is linear), or else 
P(t; w) is a strictly increasing function of t for each 
fixed w. 
4 .  Comparative Statics of the Biddina Model 
Recall that in Section 2 an optimal bid price was 
defined as any value of p which maximizes expected utility 
E(p;c,w,n) for given values of the parameters c, w, and 
n. It was demonstrated that under economically meaningful 
conditions there exists a unique optimal bid price 
The purpose of this section is the investigation of the 
change in the optimal b i d  price po caused by independent 
variations in the three parameters c, w, and n. Both the 
direction of change of 
of interest. 
PO 
po and bounds on its magnitude are 
Throughout this section we will assume, unless specifi- 
cally stated otherwise, that changes in the parameters c, 
w, and n will not cause the seller to revise his estimate 
of the bidding behavior of his competitors. Thus the proba- 
bility distribution F(p), and hence the hazard rate func- 
tion H ( p ) ,  are assumed fixed under changes in c, w, and 
n. This is, of course, a reasonable assumption for changes 
, 
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i n  w,  and a l s o  f o r  changes i n  C t h a t  are  i n t e r n a l  t o  
t h e  f i r m .  
fo r  a change i n  n 
a l l  f i r m s  competing fo r  t h e  c o n t r a c t .  L a t e r  i n  t h i s  sec- 
t i o n  w e  w i l l  comment on how o u r  a n a l y s i s  must be ex tended  
i n  order t o  t a k e  i n t o  account  r e v i s i o n s  i n  t h e  s e l l e r ' s  
es t imate  o f  t h e  b i d d i n g  behavior o f  h i s  c o m p e t i t o r s .  
T h e  assumpt ion  might  be somewhat u n r e a l i s t i c  
s i n c e  such  a change d i r e c t l y  a f f e c t s  
The E f f e c t  on t h e  Optimal  Bid P r i ce  
of a Change i n  Average Cos t  
--
-- -  
The r e s u l t s  o f  t h i s  s u b s e c t i o n  are  summarized i n  t h e  
f o l l o w i n g  theorem. 
Theorem 3: Suppose c o n d i t i o n s  ( A l )  , ( A 2 a )  , and (A3a) are 
s a t i s f i e d  and t h a t  u' and f are t h e  r i g h t  d e r i v a t i v e s  
of u and F r e s p e c t i v e l y .  I f  t h e  a v e r a g e  c o s t  c i s  
raised (lowered) by a n  amount Ac, t h e n  t h e  new optimal 
b id  p r i c e  p1 satisfies t h e  i n e q u a l i t i e s  
(4.1) 
where 
are c o n t i n u o u s ,  t h e n  
Po 5 P 1  5 Po + *c (Po L p1 L Po - Ac) 
i s  t h e  o r i g i n a l  o p t i m a l  b id .  I f  u '  and f PO 
( 4 . 2 )  Po < p 1  (Po > P,) 
I f ,  i n  a d d i t i o n ,  t h e  hazard  r a t e  f u n c t i o n  i s  s t r i c t l y  
i n c r e a s i n g  t h e n  
( 4  3 )  P1 < Po + Ac (P1 > Po - Ac) - 
, 
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Proof :  
Note t h a t  t h e  b a s i c  assumptions used i n  t h i s  theorem 
are t h e  same ones  t h a t  were used i n  Theorem 2 .  W e  a re  
t h u s  gua ran teed  t h e  e x i s t e n c e  and uniqueness  of o p t i m a l  
b i d s  f o r  t h e  v a r i o u s  v a l u e s  of  c under c o n s i d e r a t i o n  
provided o n l y  t h a t  t hey  are a l l  less than  X (see ( 2 . 4 ) ) .  
E a r l i e r  w e  de f ined  and i n t e r p r e t e d  t h e  f u n c t i o n s  
Theorems 1 and 2 w e  know t h a t ,  f o r  f i x e d  c ,  w ,  and n ,  
t h e  expec ted  u t i l i t y  E ( p ;  c ,  w,  n) has  i t s  unique  
maximum a t  
G(p) - H(p) changes s i g n .  E q u i v a l e n t l y ,  po i s  t h e  
' ' c rossover  p o i n t "  of the  g raphs  of G(p) and H(p)  
(see F i g u r e s  1 and 2 ) .  One might therefore  e x p e c t  t o  
o b t a i n  some in fo rma t ion  about  t h e  d i r e c t i o n  of change 
i n  po from t h e  s h i f t s  i n  t h e  graphs  of G(p) and H(p) 
due t o  a change i n  t h e  parameter  c. 
t h e  p o i n t  where t h e  e x p r e s s i o n  PO ' 
By assumption t h e  graph of H(p) does n o t  change when 
c changes.  However, f o r  f i x e d  p and c < p ,  w e  see t h a t  
u ' [ n ( p - c )  + w] i s  non-decreasing i n  c and u [ n ( p - c )  + w] 
i s  s t r i c t l y  d e c r e a s i n g  i n  c ,  so t h a t  ~ ( p )  = p . p - c ) + w l  u n p-cl +w] -u ( w )  
i s  a s t r i c t l y  i n c r e a s i n g  f u n c t i o n  of c .  T h i s  argument 
shows t h a t  t h e  whole graph of G(p) i s  r a i s e d  when c 
, 
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increases and lowered when c decreases. (Refer back 
to Figures 1 and 2 to visualize this.) Thus po is a 
is a strictly in- non-decreasing function of c. 
creasing function of c if both f and u1 are con- 
' tinuous so that G and H are continuous. The var ious  
PO 
1' cases provide the proper inequalities between Po and P 
nu' (nt+w) Now let t = p - c so that G(t+c) = u(nt+w) - u(q 
(t+c) For fixed c, the "crossover point" l-F(t+c) and H(t+c) = 
- c. - to - Po of the graphs of G(ttc) and H(t+c) is just 
The function G(t+c) (and therefore its graph) does not depend 
on c, while H(t+c) is non-decreasing in c for each fixed t. 
It follows (see Figure 3 )  that 
of c. (to is a strictly decreasing function of c if H is 
strictly increasing and if both u 1  and f are continuous- - 
so that G and H are continuous.) In particular, if tl and 
p1 
of c + Ac, 
to is a non-increasing function 
are the "crossover points" corresponding to an average cost 
if Ac > 0, then p1 - (C + Ac) = tl < to - Po - c - 
+ Ac. (We get strict inequality or equivalently, L p, 
if to is a strictly decreasing function of c.) The other 
inequalities follow by considering a decrease in c by an 
amount AC. 0 
- 27 - 
I I ' + t  
0 A-C 
G (t+c) 
H ( t - t c )  
I 
i 
, + t  I
0 A-C 
F i g u r e  3 
, 
, . I .  
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The conclusions of this theorem are intuitively quite 
appealing. Suppose average cost is increased by an amount 
Ac. If the bid price is left unchanged, potential average 
profit will decline from (po - c) to (Po - C - AC). 
Note that the probability of getting this smaller profit 
is still 1 - F(po). A smaller profit is now associated 
with the former probability of success, and the theorem 
tells us that the bidder "trades off" some of his 
probability of success for an increase in his potential 
profit. He therefore raises his bid price. However, 
since the bidder is risk averse, his willingness to 
"trade off" probability of success for potential profit 
declines as potential profit increases and probability 
of success decreases. In particular, the theorem tells 
us that he is totally unwilling to continue this type 
of "trade off" once he has obtained his old level of 
potential average profit. 
The Effect on the Optimal Bid Price --
- -  of a Change - in Initial Wealth 
The result of this subsection depends on an assumed 
monotonicity of the absolute risk aversion function A .  
Our result gives the direction of change in the bid price 
due to a change in initial wealth, but gives no bound on 
this change. 
- 29  - 
Theorem 4 :  Suppose conditions (Al) , (A3a), 
u is strictly increasing, concave, and con- 
tinuously differentiable, 
u' 
of its right derivative u", 
is right differentiable and is the integral 
are satisfied, and that c and n are fixed. If the bidder's 
initial wealth is raised (lowered), and if the function A 
is non-increasing, then the new optimal bid price p1 satis- 
fies the inequality 
(4.4) Po 5 P1 (Po 1 PI) 
If, in addition, f is continuous and A is strictly de- 
creasing, then the inequalities above are strict. If A 
is non-decreasing (strictly increasing) instead of non- 
increasing (strictly decreasing), then the inequalities are 
reversed. 
Proof: 
We begin by finding an equivalent expression for G(p). 
Setting e = n(p - c) , we have 
= { (p-C) [u'(t3~+w)/u'(f3+w)ld-r)-~ 1: 
where we have made the change of variables t = 8-r. Using 
the fact that a/b = exp(1og a - log b) when a and b 
- 30 - 
are positive, we obtain 
G(p) = [(p-c)Jiexp(log u'(~T+w) - log u1(0+w))d-rl-l 
where we have made the change of variables 
have noted that the reversal of the limits of integration 
x = Oy, and 
changes the sign of the integral. 
G(p) is 
Our final expression for 
B y  hypothesis, H is not affected by changes in w. 
However, from ( 4 . 5 )  we see that if A is non-increasing 
(strictly decreasing, non-decreasing, strictly increasing), 
then G(p) is a non-decreasing (strictly increasing, non- 
increasing, strictly decreasing) function of w for each 
fixed p.  
The remainder of the proof uses the arguments of Theorem 3 
and will be omitted. 
Theorem 4 indicates the relationship between the be- 
havior of the absolute risk aversion function A and the 
direction of change in the bid price due to a change in 
initial wealth. It might be helpful to look at this result 
- 31 - 
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I 
i n  i n t u i t i v e  t e r m s .  Suppose t h a t  A d e c r e a s e s  w i t h  w e a l t h ,  
i . e . ,  an i n d i v i d u a l ' s  w i l l i n g n e s s  t o  engage i n  a b e t ,  as 
measured e i t h e r  by t h e  r i s k  premium o r  by t h e  f a v o r a b l e  odds 
demanded, increases wi th  weal th .  T h i s  means t h a t  a s  h i s  
wea l th  i n c r e a s e s ,  t h e  b idde r  r a i s e s  h i s  b i d  p r i c e  (conse-  
q u e n t l y  r educ ing  1 - F ( p ) ,  h i s  p r o b a b i l i t y  of g e t t i n g  t h e  
c o n t r a c t )  i n  o r d e r  t o  i n c r e a s e  p o t e n t i a l  (and,  i n c i d e n t a l l y ,  
a l s o  expec ted)  p r o f i t .  The o p p o s i t e  t y p e  of  argument can 
be used  t o  e x p l a i n  t h e  claim of  Theorem 4 t h a t  t h e  b i d  
p r i c e  d e c r e a s e s  i f  A i n c r e a s e s  w i t h  wea l th .  
Whether A i n c r e a s e s  o r  d e c r e a s e s  w i t h  wea l th  would 
s e e m  t o  be an e m p i r i c a l  r a t h e r  t h a n  a t h e o r e t i c a l  i s s u e .  On 
t h e  b a s i s  of i n t u i t i v e  evidence and c a s u a l  o b s e r v a t i o n  w e  a r e  
i n c l i n e d  t o  a c c e p t  A r r o w ' s  [ 2 ,  page 351 h y p o t h e s i s  t h a t  abso- 
l u t e  r i s k  a v e r s i o n  dec reases  w i t h  wea l th .  
The E f f e c t  on t h e  Optimal Bid P r i ce  - --
of a Change i n  C o n t r a c t  S i z e  - -  -
The f i r s t  theorem of t h i s  s u b s e c t i o n  g i v e s  t h e  d i r e c t i o n  
of change of t h e  op t ima l  b i d  p r i c e .  I t  depends on an assumed 
mono ton ic i ty  o f  t h e  f u n c t i o n  P ( t ;  w)  i n t r o d u c e d  a t  t h e  
beginning  of s e c t i o n  3 .  (Recall  t h a t  p r o p o s i t i o n  2 of 
t h a t  s e c t i o n  s t a t e s  t h a t  i f  P ( t ;  w) i s  monotone i n  t ,  
t h e n  it must be non-decreasing.)  Our o t h e r  theorem p rov ides  
a bound on t h i s  change. 
. .  
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Theorem 5: Suppose conditions (241) , (A2b), (A3a), and ( A 4 )  
are satisfied and that c and w are fixed. If the contract 
size is increased (decreased) , and if the function P(t; w) 
is non-decreasing in t, then the new optimal bid price p1 
satisfies the inequality 
(4.6) Po 1 P1 (Po 5 P,) 
If, in addition, f is continuous and P(t; w) is a strictly 
increasing function of t, then the inequalities above are 
strict. 
Proof: 
From (4.5) and the definitions of A and P we see that 
( 4 . 7 )  G(P) = [(p-~)/~exp[/ 1 1 (l/y)P(n(p-c)y;~)dyld~l -1 . 
T 
The proof of this theorem is essentially a repetition of the 
proof of theorem 4 using ( 4 . 7 ) ,  P, and n instead of ( 4 . 5 ) ,  
A, and w. We omit it. a 
Under the assumption that P(t; w) is a non-decreasing 
function of t, one's intuition agrees with the theorem's 
description of the bidder's behavior. If the contract size 
is increased from n to n + An, then both the bidder's 
potential profit and his expected profit are multiplied by 
a factor of (n + An)/n if he maintains his old bid price 
(and if his opponents' bidding behavior is unchanged). PO 
It is intuitively reasonable that he should "trade off" some 
of his additional potential profit (and expected profit) for 
some extra probability of success (extra safety). Thus he 
. ' . .  
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should  lower h i s  b i d  p r i c e .  
I '  
I 
. 
Note t h a t  Theorem 5 does n o t  i n d i c a t e  how much of h i s  
a d d i t i o n a l  p o t e n t i a l  p r o f i t  t h e  b i d d e r  w i l l  " t r a d e  o f f "  f o r  
an i n c r e a s e  i n  h i s  p r o b a b i l i t y  of s u c c e s s .  The fo l lowing  
theorem bounds t h i s  " t r a d e  o f f .  
Theorem 6: Suppose c o n d i t i o n s  ( A l ) ,  ( A 2 a ) ,  and (A3a) a r e  
s a t i s f i e d ,  t h a t  c and w are  f i x e d ,  and t h a t  u '  and 
f are t h e  r i g h t  d e r i v a t i v e s  of  u and F r e s p e c t i v e l y .  
Then p o t e n t i a l  p r o f i t  i s  a non-decreasing f u n c t i o n  of n .  
I n  p a r t i c u l a r ,  i f  t h e  c o n t r a c t  s i z e  n i s  r a i s e d  ( lowered)  
by an amount An, t h e n  t h e  new o p t i m a l  b i d  p r i c e  p1 sa t i s -  
f ies  t h e  i n e q u a l i t y  
I f ,  i n  a d d i t i o n ,  u '  and f are  con t inuous ,  t hen  t h e  
i n e q u a l i t i e s  above a re  s t r i c t .  
P roof :  
The proof  of t h i s  theorem i s  q u i t e  s i m i l a r  t o  t h e  proof 
of  t h e  second p a r t  of Theorem 3 .  W e  l e t  s = n(p -c )  , s o  t h a t  
For  f i x e d  c and n ,  t h e  n c r o s s o v e r  p o i n t "  s of  t h e  
g r a p h s  of G(, + c)  and H ( n  + c) a s  f u n c t i o n s  of s i s  
j u s t  n ( p o  - c)  . For each f i x e d  s w e  see t h a t  G ( n  + c) 





. ' . .  
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a non- increas ing  f u n c t i o n  of n s i n c e  H ( t )  i s  non- increas ing  
i n  t .  Thus s i s  a non-decreasing f u n c t i o n  of n (and 
i s  s t r i c t l y  i n c r e a s i n g  i f  both u '  and f are c o n t i n u o u s ) .  
The i n e q u a l i t i e s  a r e  an  immediate consequence of  t h i s .  
0 
&13 
Again, t h e  r e s u l t s  of  t h i s  theorem a r e  q u i t e  r easonab le .  
One would e x p e c t  a t  l e a s t  a s  l a r g e  a t o t a l  p o t e n t i a l  p r o f i t  
on a l a r g e  o r d e r  as on a smal l  o r d e r  even i f  t h e  p r o f i t  p e r  
u n i t  were s m a l l e r .  
Theorems 5 and 6 t o g e t h e r  i n d i c a t e  t h a t  i f  t h e  c o n t r a c t  
s i z e  n i s  r a i s e d  by an amount An, t h e n  t h e  new op t ima l  
b i d  p r i c e  p1 s a t i s f i e s  t h e  i n e q u a l i t i e s  
The i n e q u a l i t i e s  are r e v e r s e d  i f  t h e  c o n t r a c t  s i z e  i s  lowered 
by an m o u n t  An. 
The preceding  a n a l y s i s  has  been based on t h e  assumption 
' t h a t  average  cost i s  c o n s t a n t .  W e  now c o n s i d e r  b r i e f l y  how 
varies w i t h  n when average  cost  c depends on t h e  PO 
l e v e l  of o u t p u t .  The a n a l y s i s  f o r  d e c r e a s i n g  average  c o s t  
i s  s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d .  Suppose an i n c r e a s e  i n  c o n t r a c t  s i z e  
from n t o  n + An d e c r e a s e s  average  cost  from c t o  
c - Ac. The e f f e c t  of such a change on t h e  o p t i m a l  b i d  p r i c e  
can be decomposed i n t o  two p a r t s .  F i r s t ,  w e  have seen  t h a t  
an  i n c r e a s e  i n  c o n t r a c t  s i z e  of An w i t h  c o s t  remaining 
c o n s t a n t  a t  c w i l l  reduce t h e  b i d  p r i c e .  S i m i l a r l y ,  a 
n e t  d e c r e a s e  i n  average  c o s t  of Ac w i t h  c o n t r a c t  s i z e  
c o n s t a n t  a t  n + An w i l l  d e c r e a s e  t h e  b i d  p r i c e  even f u r t h e r .  
, _ .  ' e .  
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These two e f f e c t s  t o g e t h e r  l o w e r  t h e  b i d  p r i c e  more than  
e i t h e r  one does by i t s e l f .  
t i o n  of c o n t r a c t  s i z e ,  t h e  two e f f e c t s  work i n  o p p o s i t e  
d i r e c t i o n s .  
d e c r e a s e  depends on t h e  s i z e  of t h e  i n c r e a s e s  i n  c o n t r a c t  
s i z e  and cost ,  and on t h e  s p e c i f i c  u t i l i t y  f u n c t i o n  of t h e  
b i d d e r .  
For  c o s t  a s  an i n c r e a s i n g  func- 
Whether t h e  op t ima l  b i d  p r i c e  w i l l  i n c r e a s e  or  
Remarks about  t h e  E f f e c t  on t h e  Optimal Bid Pr ice  -- 
o f  a Change i n  t h e  P r o b a b i l i t y  D i s t r i b u t i o n  F. - - -  --
Changes i n  F r e p r e s e n t  r e v i s i o n s  i n  t h e  b i d d e r ' s  be- 
l i e f s  about  t h e  b idd ing  behavior  of  h i s  c o m p e t i t o r s .  Such 
changes can  be d e a l t  w i th  i f  t h e y  can be expres sed  a s  appro- 
p r i a t e  changes i n  t h e  hazard r a t e  f u n c t i o n  H .  Suppose, f o r  
example, t h a t  t h e  b i d d e r  b e l i e v e s  t h a t  t h e  minimum of h i s  
c o m p e t i t o r s '  b i d  p r i c e s  i s  i n c r e a s e d  by t h e  amount A c  (due,  
pe rhaps ,  t o  an i n c r e a s e  of Ac i n  t h e  costs of  each of h i s  
c o m p e t i t o r s ) .  One way of e x p r e s s i n g  t h i s  r e v i s i o n  i n  h i s  
b e l i e f s  i s  by s e t t i n g  F*(p)  = F ( p  - Ac), where  F* and 
F are t h e  d i s t r i b u t i o n  f u n c t i o n s  e x p r e s s i n g  h i s  new and o l d  
b e l i e f s  about  t h e  minimum of  h i s  c o m p e t i t o r s '  b i d  p r i c e s .  
I f  H* and H are t h e  cor responding  haza rd  r a t e  f u n c t i o n s ,  
t h e n  H*(p) = H(p - A c ) ,  and i f  H i s  non-decreas ing ,  t hen  
u s i n g  H* i n s t e a d  of  H amounts t o  lowering t h e  whole  H 
cu rve  (or  a t  l e a s t  t o  not  r a i s i n g  it anywhere).  Thus, t h e  
, 
1 . '  ' .. 
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intersection of the curves of H* and G will be to the 
right of the intersection of the curves of H and G and 
will therefore result in a higher bid price. Notice that 
this type of argument can still be used even if the relation 
between F* and F is not clearly defined so long as the 
bidder is willing to assume that H* is non-decreasing an6 
that H*(p) < H(p) for all p. In many cases this would be 
a reasonable assumption. It merely amounts to assuming that 
if the minimum of his competitors' bid prices is at least 
then it is at least as likely to be close to 
old distribution F as under the new distribution F*. 
5. Possible Extensions of the Model 
- 
p, 
p under the 
The model developed in this paper is formulated for compe- 
titive sealed tender selling markets. 
the model is applicable to individual bidding behavior in 
sealed tender buying markets and Dutch auctions. 
With minor modifications, 
A promising application of the model is in the study of 
investment decisions associated with the submission of proposals 
for the acquisition of Research and Development ( R  & D) con- 
tracts. We briefly describe the mechanics of one kind of 
R & D contract market.4 
firms competing for a single contract to produce a specified 
The market consists of a group of 
(4) We are indebted to Walter L. Johnson for information about 
the institutional features of this market. 
, 
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I '  
q u a n t i t y  of a new p roduc t .  The p roduc t  i s  d e f i n e d  i n  t e r m s  
o f  c e r t a i n  "Standards  of performance" and cannot  be  produced 
w i t h  e x i s t i n g  technology.  
t o  submit a p r o p o s a l  on or b e f o r e  a g iven  f u t u r e  d a t e .  
p r o p o s a l  c o n s i s t s  of (1) a d e t a i l e d  s t a t e m e n t  of t h e  produc- 
t i o n  p r o c e s s  t h e  f i r m  w i l l  u s e  i f  awarded t h e  c o n t r a c t  and 
( 2 )  a b i d  p r i c e .  The c o n t r a c t  i s  awarded t o  t h e  lowest b i d d e r  
Each p a r t i c i p a t i n g  f i r m  i s  r e q u i r e d  
The 
f r o m  among t h e  p r o p o s a l s  t h a t  m e e t  t h e  r e q u i r e d  s t a n d a r d s  of  
per fonnance .  
I n i t i a l l y  each f i r m  must d e c i d e  whether t o  beg in  t h e  
R & D R 8, D work necessa ry  f o r  submission of a p roposa l .  
costs, p roduc t ion  costs ,  and t h e  payoff a r e  a l l  unknown a t  
t h i s  t i m e .  
p r o p o s a l  submission d e c i s i o n s  might  be t h e  e x t e n s i o n  of t h e  
model developed i n  t h i s  paper  t o  t h e  case where p roduc t ion  
A f i r s t  s t e p  toward a model e x p l a i n i n g  R & D 
costs c are assumed t o  be  random. Such a model would, of 
c o u r s e ,  be  u s e f u l  i n  i t s e l f .  
U n i v e r s i t y  of Missour i ,  Columbia 
, 
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